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In Ghana, the term chainsaw operator is used to
refer to an informal worker who uses a chainsaw to
fell trees. The chainsaw is a symbol of siphoning
off timber resources since the 1980s. While
chainsaws were used by the legal industry for
timber felling and sawing since the 1960s, illegal
operators began draining the timber resources won
in state concessions by formal businesses in the
1980s. The governmental attempt to regulate the
chainsaws in 1990s by decreeing their mandatory
registration through a system of permits (Marfo,
Abankwa and Agyeman 2009) did not work. The
formalisation process was either too difficult to
implement or too simple to circumvent (Quartey
2010). The Ghanaian government succumbed to
pressure from the legal industry and outlawed the
use of the chainsaw for timber cutting altogether.
However, the de-legalisation was unable to stop
illegal operations. By the third millennium,
chainsaw operators fell approximately half of all
timber harvested in Ghana, generating an
estimated loss of 12.8 million dollars per year in
public revenue (MLF 2003; Chatham House 2006:
2, 7; Darko Obiri and Damnyag 2009; Glastra
2009; Marfo 2010: 3, 16). As legal enterprises
shifted their focus to the more profitable export
market where they could exercise a monopoly,
they left the internal demand almost entirely in the
hands of chainsaw operators (Quartey 2010;
Hoare 2014). Despite the intense police
repression, the informal timber industry increased
further. In 2010, an estimated 17,000 operators,
employing 97,000 workers, were active in Ghana
(Osei-Tutu et al. 2010: 16; Marfo and Acheampong
2011: 1).
Timber concessionaires hold exclusive rights to saw trees both inside forest reserves and on
farmland (Boni 2005) but often face opposition when felling on agricultural areas. Legal firms neither
consult the villagers before timber is cut down nor pay them an appropriate compensation for the
crop damage incurred by using bulldozers to move the logs (cf. Lartey 2009). Farmers therefore often
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prefer illegal felling and find it helpful because chainsaw operators slice the timber on the spot and
head-carry the lumber to the nearest road. Villagers tend to be more sympathetic to operators who
have a close relationship with the community in which they operate, who agree to negotiate the terms
of sawing operations and who will remunerate the farm owner with money or a share of the lumber
(usually one third) (Acheampong and Marfo 2009; cf. Nutakor and Marfo 2009, Obiri e Damnyag
2009: 66-68, Obiri and Damnyag 2011).
The person financing illegal felling may be a chain saw owner, an operator, a wealthy farmer, the
owner of a small-scale lumber mill, a carpenter, a building entrepreneur or a chief (cf. Marfo 2010:
14-15). The ‘investor’ bears the full cost of the operation (chain saw fuel and maintenance,
distribution of benefits and compensation to employees and accomplices) but also pockets the timber
sale profits. The informal timber industry also benefits chain saw sellers, villagers in charge of
identifying the timber to be sawn, head-carriers, truck owners and drivers transporting timber to the
market illegally (Obiri and Damnyag 2011: 54, Marfo 2006, 2010: 21-27), buildings firms and coal-
producers (Darko Obiri and Damnyag 2009). Forest fringe communities requiring construction
materials for development projects also benefit since, paradoxically, timber obtained illegally is
cheaper and more accessible than that from the formal concessionaires who are legally obliged to
provide it (cf. Obiri and Damnyag 2011: 54). Both public and private forestry personnel in charge of
reporting illegal fellings are paid off to avoid doing so (Damnyag and Darko Obiri 2009: 153-154)
Since the chainsaw operations are accepted as legitimate by the forest fringe communities, the
informal timber industry prospers (Marfo and Nutakor 2009).
The large number of beneficiaries of informal timber felling reveals an informal power structure and
an alternative profit distribution ethics in comparison to legal firms. The formal businesses acquire
their concessions from high profile public functionaries through legal and illegal payments and seek
to impose the legitimacy of their operation on the forest fringe communities, often by bribing the chief.
Yet Ghanaian peasants often regard the law as biased in favour of protecting the interests of large
firms and therefore tend to support complex and patient negotiations of the informal industry that
generate a long-lasting working relationship and a mutual recognition between parties (cf. Kotey et al.
1998: 43). The illegal timber felling, symbolised by the chainsaw, stands for the redistribution of
benefits from the centre to the periphery, from institutions to ordinary people, and from the rich to the
needy. To prevent exclusion from the timber benefits (see Kotey and others 1998; Ahenkan and Boon
2010a; Ahenkan and E. Boon 2010b; Oduro, Agyeman and Gyan 2011, Lund et al. 2012), forest
fringe communities have opted out from the long, inefficient and costly legal disputes with timber
firms and opted instead for the informal rebalancing of benefits.
Due to the complicity of forest-fringe communities, the illegal operations are not easily detected and
repressed. Over the course of a couple of days, operators cut down the tree, saw it in lumber and
move it. Forest guards notice most chainsaw felling only when the operations are over. If authorities
manage to seize the felling equipment, operators often manage to escape. They are rarely arrested
and seldom brought to trial. If operators are trailed and charged, they are often fined rather than
incarcerated (Derkyi 2012). Chainsaw operators have recently become increasingly organised in
concealing their activities and fierce in responding to state repression. Felling sites are located far
from the road and operations are conducted at night, with villagers as lookouts. The wide network of
accomplices renders the repression of illicit cuts difficult. Moreover, riots may break out if the police
detect and try to seize the illegal timber in markets. The lack of Ghanaians’ consent for the state
forest resources management obstructs the state ability to enforce the rule of law and a gives rise to
the chainsaw. In forest-fringe communities, moral arguments about meeting villagers' basic needs or
providing informal income amidst the lack of labour transform what the law classifies as crime into a
reasonable deed (Marfo 2004; Scott 1985).
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